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Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc.: 
The Supreme Court Diminishes ERISA Preemption 
Protection for Welfare Benefit Plans 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") pro-
vides a comprehensive legal structure for the establishment and admin-
istration of both pension and welfare benefit plans. 1 Section 514(a) of 
ERISA mandates federal preemption of all state actions which would 
interfere with either of these types of plans. 2 In Mackey v. Lanier Col-
lections Agency & Serv., Inc., 3 the United States Supreme Court unan-
imously held that ERISA preempted a Georgia law prohibiting the 
garnishment of employee welfare benefits.• However, by a majority of 
five justices to four, 5 the Court upheld the use of Georgia's general 
garnishment statute6 as a means by which creditors may garnish contri-
1. As defined in ERISA section 3(1): 
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund, 
or program which [has been] established or maintained by an employer or by an em-
ployee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was 
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their 
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise ... medical, surgical, or 
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death 
or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or 
day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services .. 
29 U.S.C. § 1 002(1 )( 1982). 
2. ERISA section 514(a) states in pertinent part: "[t]he provisions of this title [Title 
!-Protection of Employee Benefit Rights] ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [which is covered by ERISA]." 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1982). 
/d. 
3. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988). 
4. /d. at 2185 citing GA. ConE ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982) which provides, in relevant part: 
Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or program subject 
to the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as 
amended, shall not be subject to the process of garnishment ... unless such garnish-
ment is based upon a judgment for alimony or for child support . 
5. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion m 
which Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia joined. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2184. 
6. GA. Com: ANN. § 18-4-20(c)(1982) provides in relevant part: 
All property, money, or effects of the defendant in the possession or control of the 
garnishee at the time of service of the summons of garnishment upon the garnishee to 
the date of the garnishee's answer shall be subject to process of garnishment except, in 
the case of collateral securities in the hands of a creditor, such securities shall not be 
429 
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butions made to a welfare benefit plan by plan participants.7 
This note first evaluates an apparent inconsistency presented by 
the Mackey decision between judicial interpretation of the language of 
ERISA's section 514(a) and congressional intent concerning that sec-
tion. It then discusses the decision's foreseeable effect on welfare benefit 
plans and proposes a possible solution to provide equal preemptive pro-
tection to both pensions and welfare benefits. 
II. THE Mackey CASE 
A. Background 
In 197 4, Congress enacted ERISA after " 'almost a decade of 
studying the Nation's private pension plans' and other employee benefit 
plans."8 Through that long deliberation, "Congress found that there 
had been a 'rapid and substantial' growth in the 'size, scope and num-
bers' of employee benefit plans and that 'the continued well-being and 
security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly af-
fected by these plans.' " 9 Overall, ERISA has three major purposes: 1) 
"assuring the equitable character of [employee benefit] plans," 2) as-
suring the "financial soundness [of employee benefit plans]" and 3) fos-
tering and protecting the growth of such plans. 10 ERISA controls two 
types of employee benefit plans: (1) pension benefit plans which pro-
vide retirement income11 and (2) welfare benefit plans which provide 
health, legal, vacation or training benefits. 12 ERISA preempts state 
laws relating to either of these two types of benefit plans. Section 514 
of ERISA states that the Act "supersede[s] any and all State laws inso-
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any [qualified] employee 
benefit plan."13 
/d. 
The preemptive power of ERISA's section 514 is very broad. 14 
subject to garnishment so long as there is an amount owed on the debt for which the 
securities were given as collateral. 
7. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2191. 
8. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 
472 U.S. 559, 569 (1985)(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 
359, 361 (1980)). 
9. ld. 
10. Kilberg & Herron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DuKE L.J. 383, 
386 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ IOOI(a) and 1144 (1976) and statements of Congressman Ullman and 
Senator Javits (120 CoNe. REc. 29198 and 29942 (1974))). 
II. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(1982). 
12. Jd. 
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982). 
14. A narrow preemption provision was originally proposed and rejected. A sponsor of the 
bill, Representative Dent, noted that "to many the crowning achievement of this legislation [is] the 
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Section 514 plays a critical role in the fulfillment of ERISA's purpose 
of fostering and protecting the growth of private employee pension and 
welfare plans. 15 By preempting state laws which deal with employee 
benefits, section 514 relieves plan administrators and multi-state em-
ployers of the burden of keeping abreast of, and complying with, a 
wide variety of state laws. 16 The relative convenience of uniform fed-
eral regulation which preemption provides encourages the growth of 
employee benefit plans. 17 
In the landmark case of Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Con-
struction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California 18 ("FTB 
II"), the Supreme Court examined the scope of ERISA's preemption 
provision as it relates to the preemption of state laws affecting em-
ployee welfare benefit plans. In FTB II, the Court held that a state's 
tax claim against a welfare benefit trust was not removable to federal 
court on the basis of the question of whether section 514(a) of ERISA 
preempted the state's power to levy on funds held in trust. 19 Thus, the 
case was vacated and remanded leaving the substantive question un-
resolved. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced and 
broadened the strength and reach of preemption with regard to welfare 
benefit plans,20 but the scope of federal preemption of state laws affect-
ing employee welfare benefit plans, the substantive issue of FTB II, has 
remained unsettled. In Mackey, the Court has addressed the issue of 
federal preemption in this context. 
B. The Facts of the Case 
The South Atlantic ILA/Employers Vacation and Holiday Fund 
("Fund") provides vacation and holiday benefits to longshoremen in 
several southeastern states21 and is an "employee welfare benefit plan" 
reservation to Federal authority the sole authority to regulate the field of employee benefit plans. 
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating 
the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 CoNG REc. 29197 
(1974). 
15. Kilberg and Herron, supra note 10, at 388. 
16. !d. 
17. /d. 
18. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
19. /d. 
20. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987)(a law "relates to" an 
ERISA regulated plan "if it has a connection with or reference to [an employee benefit] plan."); 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)(to "affect" ERISA plans, a law need only 
"relate to" plans and need not be designed to affect a plan). 
21. The employers are located in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2 n.1, Mackey v. Lanier 
Collections Agency & Service, Inc. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988). 
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as defined by ERISA. 22 Mackey and the other petitioners are trustees 
of the Fund.23 Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc. ("Lanier") is 
a collection agency which sought and obtained money judgments 
against twenty-three plan participants who owed money to Lanier's cli-
ents.24 Lanier instituted an action in a Georgia trial court seeking to 
garnish the participants' plan benefits. The trial court granted the gar-
nishment request. 211 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,26 holding 
that a Georgia statute exempted plan benefits from garnishment. 27 
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,28 hold-
ing that the Georgia law prohibiting garnishment of employee welfare 
benefits was preempted by ERISA because it conflicted with the federal 
scheme.29 In the U.S. Supreme Court, the trustees of the Fund chal-
lenged Georgia's general garnishment statute on preemption grounds 
pursuant to ERISA section 514(a) as well as defending the anti-gar-
nishment statute from preemption. 
C. The Majority Reasoning of the Supreme Court 
By simply adhering to strong precedent, the Court found no diffi-
culty in unanimously striking down the Georgia statute which gave 
special protection to ERISA plans. The preemption of the general gar-
nishment statute proved to be a more divisive issue and the applicability 
of that statute was upheld by a five to four majority. 30 The majority 
upheld the garnishment of ERISA plans as consistent with ERISA sec-
tion 502. Furthermore, the majority contended that its narrow interpre-
tation of section 514(a) was more consistent with congressional intent 
than a broad reading of the statute. 
22. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1) and 1003 (1982). 
23. The board of trustees is composed of twelve members, six are appointed by employers 
and six are appointed by the union. The Fund: 
is a type of forced savings plan, or spendthrift trust, designed to insure that the em-
ployee participants do not dissipate the vacation benefits they are eligible to receive 
through the Fund until they actually receive each year's lump sum payment. To that 
end, the Trust Agreement expressly provides that the "Fund shall not be liable for or 
subject to the debts, contracts or liabilities of the ... employees [or] beneficiaries." 
Brief for the United States at 3 n.2, Mackey, 108 S. Ct 2182 (quoting Trust Agreement at 17). 
24. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2184. 
25. !d. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. (citing GA. Com: ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982)). 
28. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 256 Ga. 499, 350 S.E.2d 439 
(1986). 
29. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2184. 
30. See supra note 5. 
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1. Georgia's anti-garnishment statute 
The Supreme Court's decision reinforced ERISA's preemption 
power in cases where the state statute makes direct reference to 
ERISA. The Court's unanimous decision on this issue reiterated its in-
terpretation of section 514(a)'s language which provides for the pre-
emption of state statutes which "relate to" employee benefit plans. The 
Court relied on two recent cases: Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 31 and 
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux. 32 
In Shaw, the Court held that the ERISA preemption provision, 
section 514, preempted state laws which "affected" employee benefits 
because such laws "relate to" ERISA. They also held that a law affect-
ing employee benefits is preempted even if the law was not specifically 
designed to affect employee benefits. 33 Pilot Life reaffirmed that a state 
law which "related to" an employee benefit plan was preempted by 
ERISA "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."34 
Thus, the Georgia statute prohibiting the garnishment of ERISA plans 
could have been preempted due to either its having an "affect" on 
ERISA plans or its "reference to" ERISA plans by mentioning them 
with particularity. 35 
2. Georgia's general garnishment statute 
Although the Court unanimously found preemption of Georgia's 
law regarding the prohibition of garnishing welfare benefits, the Court 
held that the Georgia general garnishment statute was not preempted 
by ERISA. The Court conceded that "ERISA itself offers no express 
answer as to whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with 
garnishment orders."36 Because ERISA does not explicitly address this 
issue, the Court sought to determine congressional intent via an exami-
nation of two aspects of the Act. The Court examined both the subjec-
tion of ERISA benefit plans to lawsuits for the garnishment of benefi-
ciaries' funds and the supposed redundancy of section 206(d)(1), given 
31. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
32. 481 u.s. 41 (1987). 
33. "To interpret [section] 514(a) to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect 
employee benefit plans would be to ignore the remainder of [section] 514." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98. 
34. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987)(quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)). 
35. The Court also noted that the state law would be preempted even if it "was enacted by 
the Georgia legislature to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes" as "[t]he pre-emption 
provision [of section 514(a)] ... displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including 
state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 
2185 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)). 
36. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2186. 
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a broad interpretation of section 514(a). 
The Court noted that Congress intended to subject ERISA benefit 
plans to suit under certain circumstances. Section 502(d)( 1) provides 
that "[a]n employee benefit plan may sue or be sued ... " 37 by particu-
lar persons who seek specific relief, including the recovery of plan ben-
efits.38 Plans can also be sued "for run-of-the-mill state-law claims 
such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by 
an ERISA plan."39 Since plans can be sued, it should follow that there 
must be a way of collecting the judgments, but ERISA provides no 
enforcement mechanism. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) defers 
to state law to provide methods for collecting judgments. Therefore, 
state-law methods of enforcing judgments, including garnishment, must 
remain undisturbed. The majority concluded that section 514 provides 
no distinction between a plan and its participants in terms of their 
amenability to state-law attachment proceedings. 
The majority contended that preemption of the Georgia general 
garnishment statute by section 514(a) would render section 206(d)(l) 
redundant. Section 206(d)( 1) expressly requires all pension plans to 
"provide that benefits provided under the plan not be assigned or alien-
ated."40 Therefore, the Court reasoned, "[i]f we were to give ERISA 
[section] 514(a) the meaning which petitioners and the Solicitor Gen-
eral attribute to it-barring garnishment of all ERISA plan bene-
fits-we would render [section] 206(d)(1) substantially redundant with 
[section] 514(a)."41 The Court implied that if Congress had intended 
welfare benefits to be protected from garnishment, it would have passed 
such a law. 
The Court chose to disregard the obvious redundancy which arises 
in a comparison of their narrow, non-preempting interpretation of sec-
tion 514(a) and a plain reading of section 514(b )(7). Section 514(b )(7) 
was added through the Retirement Equity Act ("REA").42 In 1984, the 
REA amended ERISA to permit the garnishment of both pensions and 
welfare benefits to satisfy a qualified domestic relations order. 43 The 
REA amendment indicates that Congress considered section 514 as 
37. !d. at 2187 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982)). 
38. !d. at 2186-87. 
39. !d. at 2187. 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)(1982). 
41. Mackey, I 08 S. Ct. at 2189. 
42. Codified at 29 U.S.C § 1144(b)(7)(Supp. II 1984). 
43. Qualified domestic relations orders are those judgments, orders and decrees which "relate 
to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former 
spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and is made pursuant to a Stale domestic rela-
tions law," which is specific regarding the amount and number of payments to be made and which 
do not increase the plan's obligation to the participant. !d. 
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originally written in 1974 to prohibit the garnishment of employee wel-
fare benefit plans. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the intent 
of the amending Congress is immaterial in determining the meaning of 
section 514(a) because "[i]t is the intent of the Congress that enacted 
[the section] that controls.""" Because the 197 4 Congress enacted sec-
tion 514(a), not the 1984 Congress, the Court determined that the leg-
islative history of the REA was irrelevant. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Section 514(a) should preempt the Georgia general garnishment 
statute because that statute "relates to" ERISA. However, the Supreme 
Court held that section 514(a) did not preempt Georgia's general gar-
nishment statute by: 1) mistakenly equating plans with plan partici-
pants' contributions for the purpose of applying ERISA section 502; 
and 2) improperly appraising congressional intent, by ignoring clear 
manifestations of recent congressional intent and, instead, relying on a 
plausible, but not indisputable, interpretation of the intent of the Con-
gress which enacted the original ERISA legislation. As a result, even 
the broad intent of ERISA as originally envisioned when passed by the 
197 4 Congress has been thwarted by the Mackey decision. 
A. The Applicability of Section 514( a) 
Section 514(a) applies to the general garnishment law because it 
indisputably "relates to" the plans themselves. By its terms, ERISA 
section 514(a) only preempts state laws that "relate to" employee bene-
fit plans. Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Mackey, stated that "state gar-
nishment laws necessarily relate to employee benefit plans to the extent 
they require such plans to act as garnishees, which is a substantial and 
onerous obligation."411 In the majority opinion, Justice White identified 
44. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2191 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 
(1977)). 
45. !d. at 2192 (Kennedy, J, dissenting). 
Justice Kennedy enumerated the additional administrative costs inherent in garnishment: 
[The plan trustees] are required to confirm the identity of each of the 23 plan partici-
pants who owe money to [the collection agency], calculate the participant's maximum 
entitlement from the fund for the period between the service date and the reply date of 
the summons of garnishment, determine the amount that each participant owes to the 
[collection agency], and make payments into state court of the lesser of the amount 
owed to [the collection agency] and the participant's entitlement. [The trustees] must 
also make decisions concerning the validity and priority of garnishments and, if neces-
sary, bear the costs of litigating these issues. Further, as trustees of a multi-employer 
plan covering participants in several States, petitioners are potentially subject to multi-
ple garnishment orders under varying or conflicting state laws. 
!d. 
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a cost affecting employee benefit plans due to an obligation to gar-
nish-the legal burden of representing the beneficiary-debtor.46 A con-
clusion that garnishment laws which impose such administrative costs 
"relate to" employee welfare benefit plans is not surprising, given the 
common sense standard that has been established for the determination 
of whether a law "relates to" ERISA. 47 Furthermore, the burden of 
administering the garnishment of employee benefits is likely to be con-
siderably greater for multi-state funds, such as South Atlantic, due to 
the differences in garnishment laws among the states. Therefore, Geor-
gia's general garnishment law should be preempted because it "relates 
to" the Fund by reason of the burden placed on the Fund. 
The five member majority did not touch upon the extent to which 
plans will be burdened with these additional costs. This was a serious 
oversight. The majority conceded that "plan trustees are served with a 
garnishment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and 
deposit the demanded funds due the beneficiary-debtor-funds that 
otherwise they are required to hold and pay out to those benefi-
ciaries."48 The majority, however, did not address the dissent's conten-
tion that the Georgia general garnishment law "relates to" ERISA, by 
imposing upon employee welfare benefit plans costs which "are not 
tenuous, remote or peripheral,"49 thus triggering section 514 as a perti-
nent statute. To reach its decision, the majority merely relied upon "in-
dicat[ions] that Congress did not intend to forbid the use of state-law 
mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare benefit 
plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan participants from re-
ceiving their benefits."50 However, these indications concern section 
502, not section 514. 
B. Logical Inconsistencies tn Mackey 
I. An over-reaching interpretation of section 502 
The Court perceived an indication of congressional intent m the 
language of ERISA's section 502. The majority noted that section 502 
"provides that civil enforcement actions may be brought by particular 
persons against ERISA plans, to secure specified relief."51 From this 
46. !d. at 2186. 
47. See Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (Both the Human Rights Law prohibiting employers from 
discriminating on the basis of pregnancy through an employee benefit plan and the Disability 
Benefits Law, requiring employers to pay specific benefits "clearly 'relate to' benefit plans.") 
48. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2186. 
49. !d. at 2192 (Kennedy, j., dissenting). 
50. !d. at 2186 (emphasis added). 
51. !d. at 2186-2187 (emphasis added). 
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mere statement of fact, the majority inferred congressional intent that 
the funds of plan participants are also subject to creditors' claims 
through a state's general garnishment laws. However, section 502 
merely provides an exception to the rule that plan funds may not be 
sued: it does not specifically authorize creditors to reach the funds of 
individual fund participants. Such an exception should be narrowly 
construed. 112 In Mackey, the exception was inferred to include a right to 
reach participants' funds in addition to plan funds and the exception 
has begun to swallow the rule. 
The Court interpreted the laws concerning the collection of judg-
ments from plans as also pertaining to the individual accounts of the 
participants in plans. The Court adopted the logic of the amicus brief 
for the respondent that "there is simply no logical way to construe the 
English language so that garnishment or attachment laws 'relate to' 
benefit plans when they are invoked by creditors of the beneficiaries, 
but not when they are invoked by beneficiaries or creditors of the [plan] 
itself. " 113 In making this assertion, the amicus brief ignored the lan-
guage of ERISA section 502 which refers to suing a plan and not a 
beneficiary and the mere fact that a plan has been entrusted with an 
account does not make that account the plan's money. An analogy can 
be drawn which illustrates the difference: if a savings bank can be sued, 
it does not logically follow that all of the bank's depositors may be sued 
to the full extent of their deposits. Moreover, section 502(d)(2) dictates 
that judgments are "enforceable only against the plan as an entity."114 
This language indicates that individual plan participants cannot be 
sued because the individuals are not "the plan as an entity." 
2. Congressional intent misinterpreted 
Although the Supreme Court did not address the precedent, it has 
held that the intent of an amending Congress is entitled to great weight. 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, M the Court held 
that the Congress' purpose for enacting ERISA in 197 4 determined the 
scope of the coverage of the Securities Act of 1933. In Western Pacific 
Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 116 the notes of a revis-
52. Strict construction is particularly appropriate where the statute in question is in deroga-
tion of common-law rules. Checkright Petroleum, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 678 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). Congress intended common law rights and responsibili-
ties to apply to ERISA. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central 
Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569-72 (1985). 
53. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2188. 
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982)(emphasis added) 
55. 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979). 
56. 345 u.s 247, 255 (1953) 
438 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
ing body were "entitled to great weight" in determining Congress' un-
derstanding of the statute. 117 
When the intent of an amending Congress is not clearly expressed, 
however, the intent of the enacting Congress is conclusive. A lack of the 
clear expression of an amending Congress' intent is manifested by: 1) 
Congress not actually passing a statute;118 2) the amending Congress not 
stating views which concern the section at issue;119 3) the amending 
Congress not clearly stating its views concerning existing law;60 or 4) 
an unmistakable record of the intent of the enacting Congress.61 The 
Mackey Court cited cases exemplifying each of these situations in sup-
port of its conclusion that the REA legislative history was not entitled 
to any weight. 62 
In applying the four preceding propositions to Mackey, the Su-
preme Court overlooked the facts of the case before it. The legislative 
history relevant to Mackey differs significantly from the cases relied 
upon by the Court. In the legislative history at issue, Congress passed 
an actual amendment to the section in question (section 514(b )(7) )-an 
amendment to section 514 of ERISA which is undeniably redundant 
under the Court's interpretation of section 514(a). In passing the 
amendment, the House Committee Report stated, "[T]he Committee 
reasserts that a state tax levy on employee welfare benefit plans is pre-
empted by ERISA (see the holding of the 9th Circuit in Franchise Tax 
Board ... )."63 The House Report also stated that: 
57. ld. at 254-55 (citing Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 68-71 (1949)). 
58. United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). The Court chose to disregard mere 
legislative observations, unaccompanied by any amendment. Interestingly, Justice Brennan pre-
dicted that "[t]he mischief the Court fashion[ed] may be short lived." McMann, 434 U.S. at 458 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). His prediction came true when Congress passed legislation which 
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to include retirement plans estab-
lished before 1967. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982)(originally enacted as Act of April 6, 1978, § 
2(b), 92 Stat. 189). 
59. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). "The 
views of members of a later Congress, concerning different sections of Title VII, enacted after this 
litigation was commenced, are entitled to little if any weight. It is the intent of the Congress that 
enacted [the original statute], unmistakable in this case, that controls." ld. at 354 n.39 (emphasis 
added). 
60. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304 (1960). The legislative history of an amendment 
"contain[ed] no clear statement as to Congress' view of then existing law." ld. at 312. 
61. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 354 n.39. 
62. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2189-91. 
63. ld. at 2191. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 655, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 42 (1984)). It is 
particularly interesting that Congress considered the Ninth Circuit's FTB I decision to be the 
controlling law in the issue before the Court. ld. The Mackey majority dismissed that decision as 
an aberration, stating that "our reading of [section] 514(a) ... is the reading given it by every 
other court that has considered the issue in this context (save the Ninth Circuit in a decision that 
was vacated by this Court)." Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2191. 
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the Committee emphasizes that, except as expressly provided, nothing 
in the bill is intended to limit or otherwise change the original broad 
intent behind ERISA's rule of preemption. That intent has always 
been to preempt state or local government laws or actions of any type 
which directly or indirectly relate to any employee benefit plan. 64 
439 
Thus, actual legislation was passed, the amending Congress stated 
views which concerned the same section as that at issue, the intent of 
the enacting Congress was unclear and the amending Congress' percep-
tion of existing law was clear. However, the Mackey Court chose to 
ignore this clear expression of congressional intent. The Court reached 
for a way around Congress' clearest and most recent intent and, in-
stead, grasped upon a less likely understanding of the intent of a chron-
ologically more distant Congress. In sum, "[ t ]he Court, which not in-
frequently calls upon Congress to manifest its intent more clearly, 
[disregarded] a clear answer given by Congress in a valid enactment."65 
In a footnote, the Mackey Court made an interesting distinction: 
"[T]he suggestion that Congress intentionally adopted, at a single time, 
two separate provisions having the same meaning ... calls a particular 
statutory interpretation into question."66 In other words, the Court is 
very unsettled by an interpretation of a complex statutory scheme like 
ERISA which renders "substantially redundant"67 one of two simulta-
neously adopted sections (514(a) and 206(d)(1)). The Court adopted an 
interpretation which renders a subsequently enacted piece of legislation 
in the same section (section 514(b)(7)) totally redundant to previously 
enacted legislation (section 514(a) ). It is more likely that a congres-
sional oversight could result in a partial (or "substantial") redundancy 
in distant sections than it is for an oversight to result in a total redun-
dancy within a particular section of legislation. Because sections 514(a) 
and 514(b)(7) are in the same section, any redundancy between them is 
64. H.R.Rep. No. 655, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 42 (1984)(emphasis added). 
65. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
66. /d. at 2190 n.14. 
67. /d. at 2189 (emphasis added). Section 206(d)(1) requires pension plans to "provide that 
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § I 056(d)(l ). 
However, if § 514(a) preempted garnishment laws, § 206(d)(l) could still be given effect; it is in a 
part of ERISA (Subtitle B. Part 2) that describes the required provisions for pension plans. There 
is no comparable part of ERISA that describes required provisions for welfare benefit plans. As a 
requirement for the drafting of a plan, § 206(d)(1) could merely be a way of ensuring that plan 
participants are given notice of § 514(a)'s prohibition on garnishment. This interpretation of § 
206(d)(l) is plausible because a plan participant is considerably more likely to read her pension 
plan than ERISA in its entirety, and notice of protection provided under ERISA may be useful to 
the plan participants. If § 206(d)(1) is read as not conferring additional protection to pension 
plans but, rather, as imposing an obligation on pension plan drafters to provide notice of a protec-
tion which is established elsewhere in ERISA (in § 514(a)), any redundant interpretation among 
the sections(§§ 206(d)(l), 514(a) and 514(b)(7)) can be completely avoided. 
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more incongruous than a redundancy between sections located in differ-
ent parts of a statute, such as sections 514(a) and 206( d)( 1 ). This stan-
dard for considering redundancy between sections in different parts of a 
statute is especially important where the statute is large, complex and 
therefore more prone to congressional oversights. Thus, congressional 
intent and congressional understanding of the meaning of section 
514(a) at the time of the REA should be given effect. 
C. Unanticipated Problems 
As noted, no member of the Court suggested that subjecting par-
ticipants' contributions to garnishment is an insignificant burden on 
employee welfare benefit plans.68 In light of the purpose of ERISA, 
such a burden is inconsistent with congressional intent. 
1. Defeat of the fund's purpose 
The purpose of a vacation trust fund is to establish a forced sav-
ings account for participants which will eventually provide them with 
enough money to take a vacation.69 By permitting garnishment of par-
ticipants' savings, a major feature of the fund is voided because the 
financially undisciplined will not be protected. Taken to its logical con-
clusion, permitting garnishment also permits assignment; a plan par-
ticipant could contract for a loan using the vacation trust account as 
collateral. Most likely, a plan participant who makes such a contract is 
the same individual (one lacking financial discipline) who most needs 
the protection of ERISA's preemption. Allowing contractual or de facto 
assignment of fund savings by plan participants defeats the purpose of 
the fund. The participants could just as easily save individually for 
their vacations under such circumstances. Also, a creditor would neces-
sarily charge a premium for loans due to the additional costs of gar-
nishment, thus making individual savings preferable. Another problem 
with the Mackey decision is that the trustees could be forced to discrim-
inate against insolvent, or nearly insolvent, plan participants. When a 
plan participant defaults on a debt, his creditors garnish the account 
and the plan as an entity must bear additional administrative costs. 
Trustees could be required to determine which employees are likely to 
go into debt and thus incur garnishment. If the trustees do not make 
such a determination and terminate the participation of high risk par-
ticipants, they could be mismanaging the funds of other participants 
68. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra note 23. 
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and could be in breach of their fiduciary duty. 70 
2. Effects beyond vacation trusts 
Under ERISA, all employee welfare benefit plans are given equal 
protection. Consequently, precedent is now established under Mackey 
for the garnishment of all forms of employee welfare benefit plans. For 
this reason, it is unfortunate that Mackey involved a vacation trust 
fund. It has, quite rightly, been noted that "[i]n real world terms, the 
loss of one's pension is far more catastrophic than the loss of funds 
devoted to financing an annual vacation."' 1 The same cannot be said of 
health benefits, which are another form of employee welfare benefit. It 
is hard to imagine a court diminishing important protection of em-
ployee welfare benefits in a case where the plan provides vital health 
care benefits instead of less critical vacation funds. 
Indeed, there are some important and recurring situations in 
which a pension is of very limited value compared with health benefits. 
A plan participant diagnosed with an advancing or terminal form of 
cancer or one who has tested positive for the AIDS virus is unlikely to 
be as interested in a pension as he would be in health care. Mackey, 
however, did not involve debtors whose dependence on the plan benefits 
would arouse much compassion. The Court had to determine whether 
to allow debtors to go on a vacation while those whom they owed were 
left uncompensated (or were forced to collect plan money after it was 
distributed). Given these options, the end that the Court reached seems 
entirely proper. However, the means used to reach that end, a means 
which places a burden on all welfare benefit plans, is inartfully done 
and goes too far. 
D. A Possible Solution 
The problems now presented by Mackey would be most properly 
solved by congressional action. Congress should pass a law which 
unambiguously preempts state laws that allow garnishment of benefits 
in an employee welfare benefit plan. However, if Congress is compelled 
to provide a different level of protection to vacation trusts than to pen-
70. Marshall v. Davis, 517 F.Supp. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (vacation and holiday fund 
trustees held liable for dilution of plan assets for economic loss which was borne equally by par-
ticipants who had acquiesced and those who had not acquiesced to a transaction). 
71. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 395 Pension Trust Fund v. 
Nevarez ("ALTCM"), 661 F. Supp 365, 370 (D. Ariz. 1987)(quoting Franchise Tax Board of 
California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California ("FTB !"), 679 F.2d 
1307,1311 (1982)(Tang, J., dissenting)). 
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sion plans, a preference expressed by some judges,72 it could make a 
distinction between what could be termed "vital" and "non-vital" wel-
fare benefits.73 Any aversion to shielding vacation funds from garnish-
ment can be satisfied by removing the preemption protection of section 
514(a) from "non-vital" welfare benefit plans (or not extending such 
protection to them) and by reaffirming or extending the preemption 
protection to cover "vital" welfare benefit plans. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
Although Mackey reaffirmed the power of federal preemption of 
statutes which specifically "refer to" ERISA, it retreated from the 
broad scope of federal preemption of state laws which "relate to" 
ERISA. This retreat will further burden employee welfare benefit 
plans with additional administrative requirements and will provide 
preferential treatment for pension plans compared with plans which 
provide equally vital welfare benefits. In reaching this decision, the 
Court expanded its ability to choose which congressional intent to con-
sider in reaching its desired result. Congressional action will be re-
quired to put both types of plans and the interests which they protect 
on a level playing field, or the Court will need to exercise some self-
restraint and take less liberty with important statutory protection. 
Richard F. Armknecht III 
72. FTB I, 679 F.2d at 1311 (Tang, J. dissenting); ALTCM, 661 F. Supp at 370. 
73. Vital welfare benefits should be those which are provided to the poor through federal 
entitlement programs and would include health and education benefits. Non-vital benefits would, 
therefore, encompass those benefits not provided through entitlement programs such as vacation 
benefits. Further guidance may be available from the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1671-77 (1982), which "Congress enacted ... for the purpose of limiting the total amount of 
wages which could be garnished [and] permitted garnishment of vacation pay to the same extent as 
other wages." Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below at 6, Markey v. Lanier 
Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988). 
